Difference-Making without Making a Difference

This paper investigates the theoretical foundations of actual causation by examining a series of seven definitions proposed by researchers Andreas and Günther. Author Sander Beckers evaluates these definitions, which have been categorized into three competing frameworks: factual difference-making, counterfactual difference-making, and regularity-based accounts. The research demonstrates that these categories are not as distinct as previously claimed, ultimately challenging the validity of all seven definitions.

The Overlap of Definitions

Andreas and Günther previously argued that their seven definitions of actual causation belonged to three separate, competing types of accounts. Beckers challenges this classification by analyzing their most recent definition—the "factual difference-making" account. He shows that this specific definition actually incorporates elements from all three types. By proving that a single definition can instantiate all three supposedly distinct categories, Beckers argues that the distinctions between these types of accounts are effectively meaningless.

Testing Against Crucial Examples

To further test the robustness of these frameworks, Beckers compares the novel factual difference-making account against the other six definitions previously introduced by Andreas and Günther. By applying these definitions to a series of crucial examples, the author demonstrates that the issues found in the most recent definition are not isolated. Instead, the analysis reveals that the flaws identified in the latest account serve to undermine the entire set of seven definitions.

Implications for Causal Modeling

The findings presented in this paper suggest a significant collapse in the theoretical structure proposed by Andreas and Günther. By showing that the definitions are not only overlapping in nature but also fail when tested against key examples, Beckers provides a critical reassessment of these accounts of actual causation. The research indicates that the current approach to defining these causal frameworks requires a fundamental reconsideration, as the existing distinctions do not hold up under scrutiny.